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M.L.B. v. S.L.J.: Protecting Familial Bonds and Creating a
New Right of Access in the Civil Courts
As every school child knows, American ideals rest on the ability
to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness! For most
Americans, the pursuit of happiness includes life with a family, free
from unwanted intrusions by the government.2 In some families,
however, the pursuit of happiness goes awry, and the government
must step in to protect the children involved. At first, such
intrusions may be limited to investigations of the family or visits from
social workers.4 When a child's life is threatened, however, states
1. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking a
statute that required children to attend public schools because of the "liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control");
Marion Huxtable, Child Protection: With Liberty and Justice for All, 39 Soc. WORK 60,
60 (1994) ("The Bill of Rights guarantees civil liberties that are envied around the world.
Family privacy, freedom from government interference, and the right to raise children
according to individual beliefs are among the fundamental rights secured by the
Constitution.").
3. See Michele Ingrassia & John McCormick, Why Leave Children with Bad
Parents?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25, 1994, at 52, 54, 58. The article describes a grisly scene of
abuse and neglect discovered in one Chicago apartment:
In the dining room, police said, a half-dozen children lay asleep on a bed, their
tiny bodies intertwined like kittens. On the floor beside them, two toddlers
tussled with a mutt over a bone they had grabbed from the dog's dish. In the
living room, four others huddled on a hardwood floor, crowded beneath a single
blanket. "We've got eight or nine kids here," Officer John Labiak announced.
Officer Patricia Warner corrected him: "I count 12." The cops found the last of
19 asleep under a mound of dirty clothes; one 4-year-old, gnarled by cerebral
palsy, bore welts and bruises.
IL at 52; see also Peter T. Kilborn, Priority on Safety Is Keeping More Children in Foster
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997, at Al (describing several children who have left abusive
homes for a healthier life with foster parents); Steven V. Roberts, Neglecting Children-
and Parents, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 25, 1994, at 10, 11 ("Probably the best
thing that society can do for its toddlers is to make 'parent' an honorable title again. No
job is more important, yet no job is more often taken for granted.").
4. See generally JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI & ROSINA M. BECERRA, DEFINING
CHILD ABUSE 211-38 (1979) (describing the types of complaints brought against parents,
dispositions of cases, and resources available to state agencies); CYNTHIA CROSSON
TOWER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 194-219 (1989) (explaining the
process of reporting and investigating child abuse and neglect); Paul E. Knepper &
Shannon M. Barton, The Effect of Courtroom Dynamics on Child Maltreatment
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have the power to sever the parent-child relationship completely and
irreversibly."
Since the social norms and mores of each state may vary, the
federal government traditionally has left these domestic issues to the
states.6 Over fifteen years ago, then-Justice Rehnquist observed that
federal involvement in domestic law "will only thwart state searches
for better solutions in an area where this Court should encourage
state experimentation. 7 Thus, absent constitutional violations, the
states are free to govern their residents' family lives as they see fit.8
In one area of domestic law, however, the Supreme Court has been
increasingly willing to intervene: When a state acts to terminate a
parent-child relationship, the Court looks to the Fourteenth
Amendment to decide what protections the parents should have.9
Proceedings, 71 SOC. SERV. REv. 288, 295-305 (1997) (examining Kentucky's
implementation of federal child-welfare legislation).
5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-18-7 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.030 (Michie 1996);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.469(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583
(1993 & Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.241(1) (West 1992); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-15-109 (1994 & Law. Co-op. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-292 (Michie 1993);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:11(II) (1994 & Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-15.1
(West 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1566 (Law.
Co-op. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-26 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1997); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1-147 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-407 (1996).
6. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Then-Justice Rehnquist remarked:
If ever there were an area in which federal courts should heed the admonition of
Justice Holmes that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic," it is in the
area of domestic relations. This area has been left to the States from time
immemorial, and not without good reason.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349
(1921)).
7. Id. at 773 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
8. See, eg., Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989) ("Because domestic
relations are preeminently matters of state law, we have consistently recognized that
Congress, when it passes general legislation, rarely intends to displace state authority in
this area."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("We do not sit as a super-
legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic
problems, business affairs, or social conditions."); DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570,
580 (1956) ("[T]here is no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of
state concern."); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) ("The whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States
and not to the laws of the United States.").
9. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768 ("[T]he 'fair preponderance of the evidence'
standard prescribed by [the New York statute at issue] violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."); Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25(1981) ("Applying the Due Process Clause is ... an uncertain enterprise which must
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Prior decisions have established that indigent parents threatened with
termination of their parental rights are entitled to a higher standard
of proof than parties in other civil proceedings? and that court-
appointed counsel might be required in certain complex cases.1' In
M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,12 the Court continued its trend of protecting indigent
parents whose familial bonds are threatened by state action, holding
that they should be provided with transcripts when appealing a
termination of their parental rights. 3
This Note discusses the facts of M.L.B., its history in the lower
courts, and the Supreme Court's resolution of the issues presented by
the case.14 The Note examines the functions of due process and equal
protection,'5 and traces the Court's application of them in both
criminal 6 and civil'7 cases involving indigents. Next, the Note
examines the protections afforded to indigents in cases that cannot
easily be classified as criminal or civil. 8 The Note explains several of
the underlying doctrines in the majority opinion in M.L.B., then
analyzes the majority's application of procedural due process,
substantive due process, and equal protection. 9 The Note then
discusses difficulties with the dissenting opinion and concludes that
due to the quasi-criminal character of a parental rights termination
proceeding, the majority's convergence of due process and equal
protection reached the correct result.2'
In June of 1992, M.L.B. and her husband S.L.J. divorced after
eight years of marriage, agreeing to leave their two children in
discover what 'fundamental fairness' consists of in a particular situation by first
considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at
stake."); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) ("It is clear that failure to give
the petitioner notice of the pending adoption proceedings [involving his child] violated
the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.").
10. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 ("We hold that [a clear and convincing] standard
adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual
conclusions necessary to satisfy due process.").
11. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32 ("[We] leave the decision whether due process
calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings to be
answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review.").
12. 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996).
13. See i at 559.
14. See infra notes 22-75 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 119-37 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 149-94 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 202-228 and accompanying text.
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S.L.J.'s custody." S.L.J. remarried shortly thereafter, and in
November 1993, he and his second wife sued to terminate M.L.B.'s
parental rights.' Their complaint alleged that M.L.B. had not
maintained reasonable visitation and that she had not kept up withher child support payments.24 M.L.B. counterclaimed, arguing that
S.L.J. had not permitted her reasonable visitation, despite a provision
in the divorce decree requiring him to do so.' After three
evidentiary hearings over the course of several months, the
Chancellor of the Chancery Court of Benton County, Mississippi,
handed down his decree terminating M.L.B.'s parental rights and
approving the adoption by the children's stepmother.'
The Chancellor's decree did not set forth any evidence or any
reasons for the decision.2 Instead, the Chancellor drew his language
directly from Mississippi's parental termination statute, declaring
that the children's relationship with their mother had eroded because
of M.L.B.'s "'serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable
absence or unreasonable failure to visit or communicate with her
minor children.' "" The Chancellor's decree accused M.L.B. of
abuse, an allegation S.L.J. never raised in any stage of the
proceedings.29 The Chancellor also stated that S.L.J. and his second
wife had met their burden of proof by "'clear and convincing
evidence.' "3
22. See ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 559. The couple had two children, a boy born in April
1985 and a girl born in February 1987. See id.
23. See id. S.L.J.'s brief alleged that M.L.B. was living with a convicted felon at the
time of the divorce and that their divorce decree allowed M.L.B. reasonable visitation, so
long as that person was not present. See Brief for Respondents at 1, M.L.B. (No. 95-853).
M.L.B. contested those allegations, arguing that S.L.J. did not allege or prove any
dangerous conduct on her part. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, M.L.B. (No. 95-
853).
24. See ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 559. S.L.J. alleged that the divorce decree required
M.L.B. to pay $40 per week to maintain medical insurance on the children, plus half of
any medical bills not covered by insurance. See Brief for Respondents at 1, ML.B. (No.
95-853).
25. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 559.
26. See Ud. The Chancellor further ordered that J.P.J., the adopting parent, be shown
as the mother of the children on their birth certificates. See id.
27. See &L at 559-60. According to M.L.B., "the Chancellor cited no specific grounds
for the termination and, despite a vigorously contested trial, cited no specific evidence
relating to or supporting his decision." Brief for Petitioner at 3, M.L.B. (No. 95-853).
28. ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 559 (quoting Petitioner's Appendix to Petition for Certiorari
at 9-10, M.L.B. (No. 95-853)); see MIss. CODE. ANN. § 93-15-103(3)(e) (1994).
29. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 559 n.1 (citing Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6 n.1, M.L.B.
(No. 95-853)).
30. Id. at 560 (quoting Petitioner's Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 10, M.L.B.
(No. 95-853)); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (requiring clear and
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M.L.B. appealed the Chancellor's decree and paid the required
$100 filing fee."' Under the Mississippi Rules of Appellate
Procedure, appellants who plan to argue that the trial court's finding
is unsupported by the evidence must order a transcript of the first
proceeding.32 Also, civil litigants in Mississippi could appeal only if
they could pay for court costs of their appeal in advance.3
Accordingly, the Clerk of the Chancery Court notified M.L.B. that
preparing and transmitting the record would cost $2352.3624 Unable
to afford the cost of the transcript, M.L.B. sought leave to appeal in
forma pauperis.35 The Mississippi Supreme Court denied her appeal
because, under its precedent, no right to proceed in forma pauperis
existed in a civil appeal."
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Mississippi
court's decision,37 with six Justices agreeing that Mississippi could not
bar M.L.B. from seeking an appellate review of her parental rights
termination simply because she could not afford to pay the costs of
the appeal in advance.' The majority reasoned that both equal
convincing evidence for parental terminations).
31. SeeM.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560.
32. See id. (citing MIss. R. APP. P. 10(b)(2); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-51-29 (Supp.
1996)).
33. See id. (citing MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-51-3, -29).
34. See id The charges included $1900 for the transcript (950 pages at $2 per page);
$438 for other documents in the record (219 pages at $2 per page); $4.36 for binders; and
$10 for mailing. See id. S.L.J. claimed that the charges were rationally related to the
legitimate state interest in helping offset costs. See Brief for Respondents at 8, M.L.B.
(No. 95-853). M.L.B. claimed that the charges arose because Mississippi law requires $2
per page to pay the court reporters and that such charges should be reduced for paupers.
See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 9, M.L.B. (No. 95-853).
35. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560. Black's Law Dictionary defines "in forma
pauperis": "[P]ermission given to a poor person (Le. indigent) to proceed without liability
for court fees or costs. An indigent will not be deprived of his rights to litigate and
appeal; if the court is satisfied as to his indigence he may proceed without incurring costs
or fees of court." BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 537 (6th ed. 1991) (citing FED. R. APP. P.
24).
36. The Mississippi Supreme Court issued an order denying M.L.B.'s request to
proceed in forma pauperis. The order stated:
"The appellant claims he [sic] is unable to pay the costs of appeal and that the
Court should suspend the rules and allow the appellant to proceed in forma
pauperis.... The right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil cases exists only at
the trial level. The [Mississippi Supreme] Court finds that the motion should be
denied."
Brief for Petitioner at 7, M.L.B. (No. 95-853) (quoting the order) (citations omitted). An
editorial describing this case remarked that "Mississippi's insensitivity seemed to scream
out for reversal." Opening the Door to Equal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996, at A26.
37. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570.
38. See id. at 559. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer. See id at 558. Justice Kennedy
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protection and due process concerns were at stake in the case. 9 The
equal protection concern, the Court explained, related to "the
legitimacy of fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their
inability to pay core costs,"" whereas the due process concern
centered on "the essential fairness of the state-ordered proceedings
anterior to adverse state action."" Writing for the Court, Justice
Ginsburg avoided putting any precise label on the rationale, but
noted that most decisions in this area" 'res[t] on an equal protection
framework.' ,,42
The majority agreed with M.L.B. that Mayer v. City of Chicago43
was controlling.' In Mayer, the Court struck down an Illinois rule
that allowed free transcripts on appeal only when the defendant had
been convicted of a felony.4 Finding the distinction between felonies
and non-felonies to be an "'unreasoned distinction,' ,46 the Court in
Mayer held that the defendant should be permitted to appeal without
paying for a transcript.' In reaching that conclusion, the Court
weighed the State's fiscal interest against the defendant's interest in
appealing his conviction and determined that the State's interest was
"irrelevant."48 In M.L.B., therefore, the Court applied the same
analysis employed in Mayer: balancing the individual interests on the
one hand and the State's interests on the other.49 Noting the severity
concurred in the result. See id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined in full by Justice Scalia and in part
by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
39. See id. at 566.
40. Id. (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,23 (1956) (plurality opinion)).
41. Id. (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974)). Justice Kennedy remarked
in his concurrence that "[h]ere, due process is quite a sufficient basis for our holding." Id.
at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
42. Id. at 566 (alteration in original) (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665
(1983)).
43. 404 U.S. 189 (1971). Mayer worked an extension of the rule established in Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion), that indigent defendants in a criminal
trial have a right to a free transcript. See Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196-97; see also infra notes
99-104, 108-14 and accompanying text (discussing Mayer and Griffin).
44. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566.
45. See Mayer, 404 U.S. at 191.
46. Id. at 196 (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305,310 (1966)).
47. See id. ("The size of the defendant's pocketbook bears no more relationship to his
guilt or innocence in a nonfelony than in a felony case."). The Court went on to note that
"[t]he invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made
available only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the sentences that
may be imposed." Id. at 197.
48. See id.
49. See ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566 (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666-67
(1983)).
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and finality of having one's parental status terminated, the Court
determined that the stakes for M.L.B. were "large [and] 'more
substantial than mere loss of money,'" while Mississippi's interest
was merely financial. ° In addition, although fee requirements
generally are examined only for rationality, 51 the Court noted two
important limitations to this rule: (1) the right to vote or to run for
office cannot be limited by the ability to pay for a license' and (2)
the right of access to the courts in criminal or "quasi-criminal" cases
may not be limited by the ability to pay. 4 M.L.B.'s case, the Court
determined, was to be treated as a petty offense appeal;55 under the
holding in Mayer, therefore, she would be entitled to a free
transcript.
5 6
After examining the due process protections afforded criminal
defendants, the Court examined the procedural protections that are
50. Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,756 (1982)).
51. If challenged legislation does not involve a fundamental interest or a suspect
classification, then it is reviewed for a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
interest. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973); see also, e.g., Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding a $25 filing fee as a rational
offset to expenses when the litigants sought appeal of an administrative agency's decision
to reduce their welfare payments); Kras, 409 U.S. at 447 (upholding a $50 filing fee as a
rational precondition to bankruptcy discharge).
52. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 568 (citing Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709,710,718 (1974)
(striking down a California ballot-access fee); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 135, 145,
149 (1972) (striking down a Texas ballot-access fee); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663,666 (1966) (striking down a poll tax of $1.50 per year)).
53. Quasi-criminal offenses include violations of city ordinances and are commonly
referred to as petty offenses. See, e.g., Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 459
(1969) (" '[A]n indigent person, convicted for a violation of a city ordinance, quasi
criminal in nature and often referred to as a petty offense, is entitled to a... transcript at
city expense in order to perfect an appeal ....... (quoting Williams v. Oklahoma City, 439
P.2d 965, 965 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 458 (1969))).
54. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 568. The Court recognized a right of access to the
criminal courts in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963). In Rinaldi v. Yeager,
384 U.S. 305 (1966), the Court remarked that "once established .... avenues [of appellate
review] must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal
access to the courts." Id. at 310 (citations omitted). The Court has further explained that
the right of access to the courts cannot be limited to those cases in which confinement was
the penalty. See, eg., Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971) (noting that a
"fine may bear as heavily on an indigent accused as forced confinement").
55. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 565-66. The Court noted that "M.L.B .... maintains that
the accusatory state action she is trying to fend off is barely distinguishable from criminal
condemnation in view of the magnitude and permanence of loss she faces." Id. at 565
(footnote omitted).
56. See id. at 570; see also Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196 ("The size of the defendant's
pocketbook bears no more relationship to his guilt or innocence in a nonfelony than in a
felony case.").
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available for civil litigants." Citing Boddie v. Connecticut,s the Court
reiterated that when a fundamental interest is at stake, "the State
must provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a
party's ability to pay court fees."59 Justice Ginsburg distinguished
termination proceedings from the "mine run" of civil cases by noting
that the Court has not extended heightened procedural protections to
civil litigants when "state controls or intrusions on family
relationships" were not at issue.'
Finally, the Court recognized that "[c]hoices about marriage,
family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational
rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in our society.' 61
In light of its previous decisions establishing heightened procedural
protections for indigent parents facing parental rights terminations,'
the Court concluded that the parent-child relationship is
"'sufficiently fundamental'" to warrant special protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.6 Justice Ginsburg also noted that previous
decisions in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services and Santosky
57. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 562.
58. 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (striking a statute that premised the right to divorce on a
litigant's ability to pay a $60 filing fee).
59. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 562 ("We have also recognized a narrow category of civil
cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a
party's ability to pay court fees.").
60. See id at 563-64. Justice Ginsburg stated that Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656,
659 (1973) (per curiam), which upheld a $25 filing fee as a rational offset to expenses
when the litigants sought appeal of an administrative agency's decision to reduce their
welfare payments, underscores her point. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 563-64.
61. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564 (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376).
62. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that a "clear and
convincing" standard is the appropriate burden of proof in termination of parental rights
proceedings); Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (suggesting
that due process might require appointed counsel in certain types of complicated
termination proceedings).
63. See ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 565 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 774). The Court has
long recognized that certain rights are "fundamental" and therefore require heightened
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 483, 484 (1965) ("[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.");
see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (recognizing a fundamental right
in interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding
that the right to vote is fundamental); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963)
(requiring states to provide counsel for indigents in criminal appeals, implying that the
right of access is fundamental); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-
61 (1958) (determining that the right to free association is a fundamental right implied by
the First Amendment).
64. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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v. Kramero were especially on point because they dealt specifically
with termination proceedings." In Lassiter, the Court stated that
appointed counsel might be required for indigent parents in certain
complex termination proceedings in order to serve due process,
although the Court did not grant appointed counsel in that case.67
Moreover, in Santosky, the Court afforded parents additional
protection by holding that a "clear and convincing" standard of proof
was required in any termination proceeding.'
Justice Thomas, in a dissenting opinion joined in full by Justice
Scalia and in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected the majority's
conclusion that due process and equal protection concerns were at
issue in M.L.B.69 First, Justice Thomas argued that due process does
not require a state to provide any appeal, even in a criminal case."
He distinguished the Court's previous decision in Boddie v.
Connecticut,7' which allowed indigents to proceed in forma pauperis
when they sought divorce, because Boddie did not involve any right
to an appeal.7 In M.L.B., unlike Boddie, Justice Thomas asserted
that the litigants were not seeking their first hearing, but had already
been afforded a full trial.' Justice Thomas also noted the procedural
protections that Mississippi had provided for M.L.B.-including
court-appointed counsel and a "clear and convincing" standard of
proof-and concluded that her due process rights had been served.'
Finally, he criticized the majority's application of equal protection
65. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
66. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564.
67. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 ("If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at
their strongest, the State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at
their peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors did not overcome the
presumption against the right to appointed counsel .... ." (applying Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), in which the Court articulated that due process requires
balancing the private interests, the government interests, and the risk of an erroneous
deprivation)).
68. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48.
69. See ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 571 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 571-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S.
684 (1894), in which the Court noted:
A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however
grave the offence of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law and
is not now a necessary element of due process of law. It is wholly within the
discretion of the State to allow or not to allow such a review.
Id. at 687.
71. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
72. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
73. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
74. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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principles because Mississippi's statute was facially neutral and did
not involve any purposeful discrimination.75
It is well accepted that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."76
Writing for the Court in Griffin v. Illinois,' Justice Black invoked the
language of Magna Carta to emphasize the longevity of that idea:
"'To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse, or delay, right or
justice.' "' In accordance with those principles, the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees certain rights:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
The Court has long struggled to determine how much process is due
when those involved cannot pay for it."
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizens both due
process and equal protection of law." A precise definition of due
75. See id. at 573-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Previously, in Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), the Court upheld a personnel test it found "facially neutral,"
notwithstanding a challenge that the test had a discriminatory effect. See id. at 241. The
holding in Washington established that a prima facie case of discriminatory state action
must include proof of intent to discriminate. See id.
76. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court
has quoted this language frequently. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 664
(1983); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235,241 (1970); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708,710 (1961).
77. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
78. Id. at 16 (quoting MAGNA CARTA ch. 40). In modem times, these guarantees
have stood for the idea that "all people charged with crime, must, so far as the law is
concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.'" Id.
at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,241 (1940)).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
80. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (granting a right to
appointed counsel in first appeal of right in criminal cases); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19
(recognizing the right to a free transcript in a criminal appeal). But see Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600, 616-17 (1974) (determining that the right to appointed counsel in criminal
appeals does not extend to discretionary appeals to appellate courts or the United States
Supreme Court). Helpful background information on the Fourteenth Amendment,
including full-text United States Supreme Court opinions, is available on the Internet.
See Findlaw: U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment (visited Oct. 29, 1997)
<http'//www.findworld.com/data/constitution/amendmentl4>.
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. One commentator has found the Court's
conflation of due process and equal protection analyses somewhat disturbing: "Because
the Court has uncritically substituted one for the other, and because historical
circumstance and the value commitments of different generations have combined in
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process, however, is both nonexistente and arguably undesirable."
Over time, the Court has recognized two facets to due process
review: procedural and substantive." "Procedural due process
guarantees only that there is a fair decision-making process before
the government takes some action directly impairing a person's life,
liberty or property."'  When the Court reviews a statute for
procedural due process violations, it weighs the private interests
affected, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, and the countervailing
government interests.6
Alternatively, substantive due process is concerned with the
constitutionality of the underlying rule being challenged. Unlike
procedural due process, substantive due process refers to a broad
concept of autonomy and liberty guaranteed to all citizens, including
rights enumerated by the United States Constitution and the
common law.' Within this concept, the "Court has long recognized
that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 9  Such rights are held to be
twisted patterns, liberty and equality have become blurred as constitutional ideals." Ira
C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981, 983
(1979).
82. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) ("For all its
consequence, 'due process' has never been, and perhaps never can be, precisely
defined.").
83. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20-21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment)
("'Due process' is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law-the least confined to
history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society.").
84. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.6, at 12-15 (1986).
85. 2 id. at 12. The authors also comment that "[oine cannot ascribe a specific
meaning to the term 'liberty' [in the Due Process Clauses] for it may encompass any form
of freedom of action or choice which is accorded constitutional recognition by the Court."
2 id. § 17.4, at 212 (footnote omitted).
86. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,334-35 (1976).
87. See 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 84, § 14.6, at 13. As the authors note,
"[e]very form of review other than that involving procedural due process is a form of
substantive review." Id.
88. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (stating that the test for
whether certain rights are fundamental is whether the right is a" 'fundamental principle[l
of liberty and justice which lie[s] at the base of all our civil and political institutions'"
(quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312,316 (1926))).
89. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); see also, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (determining that married couples
have a constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy). Justice Harlan, concurring in
Griswold, wrote: "[Tihe proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this
Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the enactment violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Palko, 302
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"fundamental,"" and if a statute threatens a fundamental right, the
Court allows it to stand only if the government can demonstrate a
compelling interest.91 If a statute does not interfere with a
fundamental right, then the Court is deferential, examining the
statute only for a rational relationship between the statute and a
legitimate state interest.'
In addition to due process, the Fourteenth Amendment also
guarantees "equal protection of the laws."' ' Succinctly put, the thrust
of the Equal Protection Clause is that states must treat similarly
situated citizens similarly.4 Whereas substantive due process
protects certain modes of conduct by citizens, equal protection of the
law protects citizens from arbitrary discrimination." In examining
U.S. at 325).
90. See 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 84, § 15.7, at 79. The authors explain that
fundamental rights are those that the Court recognizes as so essential to individual liberty
that it is justified in reviewing the acts of other branches of government to ensure no
violations occurred. See 2 id.; see also Lupu, supra note 81, at 1030-50 (listing the sources
of fundamental rights as (1) incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process
Clause, (2) values implied by the structure of the Constitution, (3) judicial judgment, (4)
traditional values, and (5) contemporary values); Martha I. Morgan, Fundamental State
Rights: A New Basis for Strict Scrutiny in Federal Equal Protection Review, 17 GA. L.
REV. 77, 78 (1982) (asserting that state-recognized fundamental rights should be an
additional basis for strict scrutiny analysis).
91. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,472 (1977).
92. See, e.g., id. at 474 (upholding a Connecticut statute that withheld funds in cases
in which an abortion was not medically necessary; the statute was not unconstitutional
because there was no fundamental right to an abortion, the state had a legitimate interest
in encouraging childbirth, and the statute was rationally related to this purpose); Ortwein
v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973) (per curiam) (determining that interests in welfare
payments are not fundamental, and therefore only examining a filing fee for rationality);
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973) (holding that there is no fundamental
interest in discharging bankruptcy debts, and therefore only examining a filing fee for
rationality). At first, the Court used substantive due process to overturn state laws
regulating citizens' economic affairs, see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64
(1905), but this approach was ultimately abandoned in the late 1930s, leaving "debatable
issues as respects business, economic, and social affairs to legislative decision," Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423, 425 (1952). During the 1960s, however, the
Court embarked on a period of judicial activism during which it reviewed statutes closely
for both suspect classifications and state infringements on "fundamental rights." See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)
(plurality opinion) (access to courts).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Distinctions between substantive due process and
equal protection are often subtle, and the Court consistently shies away from confining its
holdings to one'or the other. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983)
("ITihe issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.").
94. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1, at 1438 (2d
ed. 1988).
95. See id. § 16-2, at 1440; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 24 (1973) ("[Ihe Equal Protection clause does not require absolute equality or
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statutes for equal protection violations, the Court applies one of
three standards of review: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or
strict scrutiny.96 The standard of review applied will depend primarily
on whether the Court finds that the legislation in question creates a
"suspect class."'' Suspect classifications include race and national
origin, but generally classifications based on wealth are not "suspect"
unless a fundamental right is involved.98
The Court first recognized the problems faced by indigent
criminal defendants more than forty years ago in Griffin v. Illinois."
precisely equal advantages."). Professor Tribe explains that the right to equal treatment
applies to a limited set of interests-including voting, interstate travel, access to the
courts, and family interests-and "demands that every person have the same access to
these interests"; the right to equal treatment does not extend to all interests, however,
because then governments would be prevented from classifying citizens when it is in the
public interest. See TRIBE, supra note 94, § 16-1, at 1437.
96. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970) (establishing that under
rational basis review, a statute will be overturned only if there is no rational justification
for the legislation); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(anticipating that legislation that discriminates against "discrete and insular minorities"
will be reviewed for equal protection violations more closely than legislation that is
facially neutral). See generally 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 84, § 18.3, at 324-35
(explaining the different standards of review and their applications).
97. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (defining suspect classes as
those groups who historically have been discriminated against; or who exhibit obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; or who
are a minority or are politically powerless). The Court has elaborated upon suspect
classifications:
Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice
rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.
Legislation predicated upon such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible
with the constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged
individually and is entitled to equal justice under the law. Classifications treated
as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal. Finally, certain
groups ... have historically been "relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process."
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 n.14 (1982) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28
(citations omitted)). See generally TRIBE, supra note 94, § 16.6, at 1453-54 (arguing that
strict scrutiny is most powerful when applied in challenges to legislation that discriminates
against the "perennial losers in the political struggle").
98. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29. In Rodriguez, the Court did not apply strict
scrutiny because it held that the class of citizens in any given tax district was too large and
amorphous to be suspect and that the challenged statute did not deprive any citizen of a
fundamental right. See id. at 28, 37; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977)
(holding that indigent women seeking abortions did not constitute a suspect class). See
generally 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 84, § 18.25, at 548-54 (discussing classifications
based on wealth).
99. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion). See generally Michael J. Klarman,
Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 64-65 (1996)
(explaining that attitudes toward indigents had changed considerably since the Great
Depression had left many destitute).
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In Griffin, the Supreme Court considered whether a state's denial of
a free transcript to an indigent prisoner seeking appellate review
violated the Constitution."' A plurality of the Court reasoned that
because all states provide appeals in criminal cases and because many
criminal convictions are reversed by appellate courts, denying
adequate review would lead to unjust results."' Noting that appellate
review was an integral part of the Illinois trial system, the plurality
concluded that "[d]estitute defendants must be afforded as adequate
appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy
transcripts."'" Because Illinois's denial of a free transcript
discriminated against poor defendants, the Court determined that it
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court relied on both the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses."
Consistent with its holding in Griffin, the Court in Douglas v.
California"°5 decided that the Fourteenth Amendment also requires
appointed counsel in criminal appeals of right.' Although the Court
100. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13-15. Previously, Illinois provided transcripts only for
indigent prisoners with death sentences. See id. at 14.
101. See id. at 18-19 ("Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording
equal justice to all and special privileges to none in the administration of its criminal
law.").
102. Id. at 19. The Court cautioned, however, that although a transcript may not be
necessary in every case, the State must still provide some means of affording adequate
and effective appellate review to indigent defendants. See id. at 20. Moreover, Justice
Frankfurter remarked that the states cannot "bolt the door to equal justice." Id. at 24
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. See id. at 20. Justice Harlan disagreed with the plurality in Griffin, arguing that
"if a transcript is used, it is surely not unreasonable to require the appellant to bear its
cost." Id. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan maintained that "the basis for
[this] holding is simply an unarticulated conclusion that it violates 'fundamental fairness'
for a State which provides for appellate review ... not to see to it that such appeals are in
fact available to those it would imprison for serious crimes." Id. at 36 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Harlan's vigorous dissents against the majority's ostensible equal
protection holdings continued until he wrote the majority opinion in Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), which rested on substantive due process grounds. See
id. at 381. See generally Norman Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan and the Warren Court, in
THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 109, 109-22 (Mark
Tushnet ed., 1993) (discussing the broad spectrum of political views embraced by Justice
Harlan during his tenure on the Court).
104. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17 ("[O]ur ... constitutional guaranties of due process
and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious
discriminations between persons and different groups of persons.").
105. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
106. See id. at 357. In dissent, however, Justice Harlan pointed out that California's
screening procedure did not deny anyone the right to appeal and argued that the majority
was reading into the Constitution "a philosophy of leveling that would be foreign to many
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did not explicitly state which clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
the challenged statute violated, it seemed to rest its holding on both
due process and equal protection concerns. 7 Likewise, in Mayer v.
City of Chicago,"8 a unanimous court agreed that a state could not
restrict an indigent's access to a transcript in a criminal appeal to
cases in which the defendant faced imprisonment." The defendant
in Mayer, convicted of a petty offense,"' had been denied a free
transcript to appeal his conviction because Illinois law required free
transcripts only in felony cases."' Rejecting the argument that states
need only provide transcripts for defendants facing jail terms, the
Court determined that Griffin represented "a flat prohibition against
pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be
available to others able to pay their own way."" Thus, under the rule
established in Mayer, even defendants convicted of petty offenses or
"'quasi-criminal' "". conduct have rights to a free transcript if
necessary for their appeal."
After Mayer, the Court began restricting its previously expansive
approach to the Fourteenth Amendment."5 In Ross v. Moffitt,"' the
of our basic concepts of the proper relations between government and society." Id. at 362
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Other decisions of the Court also protected indigent access to the
criminal courts. See, e.g., Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370 (1969) (recognizing an
automatic right to free transcripts for indigents applying for writs of habeas corpus to a
state supreme court); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (striking down a New
Jersey statute that required unsuccessful appellants who were imprisoned to pay for their
transcripts, while those who were sentenced to probation or a fine did not have to pay).
107. See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court appears to
rely both on the Equal Protection Clause and the guarantees of fair procedure inherent in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with obvious emphasis on 'equal
protection.' "). The Court's reliance on equal protection was hardly surprising given that
"[w]hen the Warren era opened, due process clause activism, outside of Bill of Rights
concerns, was in the deepest disrepute." Lupu, supra note 81, at 995-96.
108. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
109. See id at 198. Chief Justice Burger concurred, noting that alternatives to a full
verbatim transcript did exist. See id at 199-201 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun added that the defendant's financial situation had probably changed upon his
graduation from medical school, and that such factors should be considered on remand.
See id. at 201 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
110. The defendant had been charged with disorderly conduct and interference with a
police officer, resulting in fines of $500. See id. at 190.
111. See id. at 191. Following Griffin, Illinois provided free transcripts to any indigent
convicted of a felony. See id. at 191-92 n.2.
112. Id. at 196-97. That the defendant did not face a jail term was unimportant, the
Court concluded, because fines and other punishments could weigh just as heavily. See id,
113. Id at 196 (quoting Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458,459 (1969)).
114. See id at 198. In M.L.B., however, Justice Thomas argued that Mayer was "an
unjustified extension [of Griffin v. Illinois] that should be limited to its facts, if not
overruled." M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 576 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115. See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 327 (1976) (holding that a free
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defendant, after exhausting his appeals of right, sought court-
appointed counsel for discretionary appeals to the North Carolina
and United States Supreme Courts.1 7 Writing for the United States
Supreme Court, then-Justice Rehnquist concluded that neither due
process nor equal protection required North Carolina to provide
counsel for discretionary appeals.'
While a fundamental right of access to the courts for indigent
criminal defendants is well-established, the rights of indigent civil
litigants are far less clear. 9 The Court first addressed this problem in
Boddie v. Connecticut,12" when indigents seeking a divorce could not
pay their court costs in advance.12' To file for divorce in Connecticut,
litigants had to pay a sixty-dollar fee for filing and service of
process.'" Relying solely on due process,'2' the Court concluded that
the statute violated the appellants' due process rights.24 Writing for
the Court, Justice Harlan reasoned that because the power of the
state must be invoked to create or dissolve a marriage, the appellants
transcript is not required on discretionary appeal if the indigent chose not to pursue his
first appeal of right). See generally Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 289-90 (1991) (accounting for the shift
in approach by positing that the Burger Court was reluctant to reconceptualize equal
protection as an entitlement to affirmative governmental assistance).
116. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
117. See id. at 604.
118. See id. at 610, 616. Under the Due Process Clause, the Court explained, "[t]he
fact that an appeal has been provided does not automatically mean that a State then acts
unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to indigent defendants at every stage of the way."
Id. at 611. Examining the defendant's equal protection argument, the Court noted that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires only "that the state appellate system be 'free of
unreasoned distinctions.'" Id. at 612 (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310(1966)). The dissent argued that Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), was
grounded in concepts of fairness and that an indigent defendant seeking a discretionary
review would be at a substantial disadvantage without counsel. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 620-
21 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
119. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam) (denying
access to appellants seeking review of an administrative decision to reduce their welfare
benefits); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (rejecting the argument that
litigants seeking discharge of bankruptcy debts have a fundamental interest in litigating);
cf. Jeffrey R. Pankratz, Neutral Principles and the Right to Neutral Access to the Courts, 67
IND. L.J. 1091, 1104-08 (1992) (arguing that because only the judiciary can be relied on to
protect individual rights, all citizens must have access to the courts).
120. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
121. See id. at 372.
122. See id. There was no dispute as to the inability of the appellants, whose sole
income was welfare, to afford the court costs. See id. at 372-73.
123. See id. at 377 ("These [aforementioned] due process decisions ... provide, we
think, complete vindication for appellant's contentions.").
124. See id. at 380.
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had no other recourse for resolving their dispute."z  The Court
explained further that because the appellants were forced to seek
judicial remedies, under the Due Process Clause they must be given
an opportunity to be heard.1" Emphasizing the importance of the
marriage relationship in American society, the Court concluded that
Connecticut's interest in preventing frivolous litigation and managing
court costs was not enough to override the appellants' right to be
heard."l
In the decisions that followed Boddie, the Court refrained from
expanding judicial access to civil litigants when no fundamental right
was involved'28 In United States v. Kras, 29 the Court upheld a statute
requiring those involved in bankruptcy proceedings to pay a filing fee
before they could discharge their debts in court."3  Resting its
decision on due process, the Court stated that "bankruptcy is hardly
akin to free speech or marriage""' and determined that no
fundamental interest was at stake? 2 Instead, the Court noted that
the appellants could seek other avenues of redress and that they had
125. See id. at 376. Justice Brennan, concurring, agreed with the majority that the
statute violated due process but argued that the judiciary provided the only forum for
disputes that could not be settled privately; therefore, it should not matter whether the
dispute being litigated involved a fundamental right or not. See id at 387 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part). In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), however, the Court
characterized Boddie as a case in which the state monopolized processes affecting
fundamental rights. See id at 469-70 n.5. For a discussion of the monopoly doctrine, see
Lupu, supra note 81, at 1006-11. According to Professor Lupu, the Court's decisions
suggest that there is a core of exclusive governmental activities that the state may not
administer in a discriminatory way. See id. at 1010.
126. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377.
127. See id at 381.
128. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658-59 (1973) (per curiam); United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973). Despite many appeals to do so, the Court has
been reluctant to find new fundamental rights in recent years. See, e.g., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271 (1997) (holding that no fundamental right is threatened
when a statute bans suicide); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 462 (1988)
(holding that there is no fundamental right to free bus service to school); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (holding that there is no fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974)
(holding that there is no fundamental right to cohabitate with non-family members). But
cf. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 957-58 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (arguing that civil courts should be open to all citizens,
regardless of the dispute, because "fundamental rights" are difficult to define).
129. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
130. See id. at 450.
131. Id. at 466.
132. See id. at 445 ("We see no fundamental interest that is gained or lost depending
on the availability of a discharge in bankruptcy.").
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not been denied due process. 33 In its equal protection analysis, the
Court reasoned that because bankruptcy legislation fell under the
rubric of social and economic legislation and did not threaten any
fundamental rights, the statute should be reviewed only for
rationality."4 Similarly, in Ortwein v. Schwab,'35 the Court upheld an
Oregon statute that required litigants to pay twenty-five dollars
before filing suit when the appellants sought review of administrative
decisions affecting their welfare payments."m The Ortwein Court
found that the challenged filing fee did not violate due process or
equal protection. 37
Finally, several cases reviewed by the Court did not fit neatly
into either criminal or civil categories.39 Mental competency
hearings,'39 juvenile proceedings," and termination of parental rights
proceedings' were all labeled as civil matters, but the Court
recognized the punitive aspects inherent in all three.'42 Accordingly,
133. See id. at 446. In dissent, Justice Stewart argued that the appellants' due process
rights had been violated because, like the appellants in Boddie, they had no effective
recourse outside the judicial system. See id. at 455 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 446 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485-86 (1970)).
135. 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam).
136. See id. at 661.
137. See id. at 659. The majority distinguished Boddie because these appellants had
already had an agency hearing and Boddie was not concerned with post-hearing review.
See id. Among four separate dissents, Justice Douglas argued that Boddie should apply
because the statute threatened the appellants' ability to subsist and because their only
recourse was judicial review. See id. at 662 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally
Klarman, supra note 115, at 287 (reviewing Justice Douglas's conference notes and
concluding that "all four of the Nixon appointees either doubted whether Boddie
remained good law, or emphasized that, if it did, the Court should narrowly confine it").
138. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1967) (implying that constitutional
guarantees of due process applicable to criminal proceedings are also applicable to
juvenile court proceedings).
139. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (noting that civil commitment
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty and results in a stigma).
140. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 50.
141. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1981)
(differentiating between civil and criminal cases on the basis of loss of physical liberty).
142. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (recognizing the similarities
between termination of parental rights and criminal proceedings). The Court pointed out
that "[u]nlike criminal defendants, natural parents have no 'double jeopardy' defense
against repeated state termination efforts." Id. at 764; see also Florence I. Brammer,
Recent Case, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 664, 673 (1980) (arguing that courts could simplify the
problems created by quasi-criminal proceedings if they appointed counsel only for those
indigent defendants who were "haled into court"); Thomas W. Hardin, Recent Case, 7
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 316, 321-25 (1980) (claiming that the rights available to those
involved in juvenile court proceedings and civil commitment hearings ought to be
extended to indigent parents in termination proceedings).
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the Court afforded parties in these types of cases more protection.143
In both Lassiter v. Department of Social Services4" and Santosky v.
Kramer,'45 the Court grounded its holdings in procedural due process
concepts.'" In Lassiter, the majority agreed that certain complex
parental termination cases might require appointed counsel.
Likewise, in Santosky, the Court determined that clear and
convincing evidence was required whenever the individual interests
at stake were both "'particularly important' and 'more important
than mere loss of money.' 48
In granting M.L.B. a free transcript, the Court marked a
significant shift in its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.49 In
essence, the Court has created a new right: the right to proceed in
forma pauperis in any civil appeal in which a "fundamental right" is
at stake.m Before M.L.B., the Court in Boddie v. Connecticutm
determined that indigent civil litigants seeking a divorce could
proceed in forma pauperis at the trial level due to the fundamental
143. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (explaining that "clear and convincing"
evidence is the appropriate standard when government-initiated action threatens the
individual with a significant deprivation of liberty); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 (suggesting
that appointed counsel for indigents facing termination of parental rights would be
appropriate in complex cases); Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33 (noting that a "clear and
convincing" standard of proof in civil commitment hearings is appropriate because it
impresses the factfinder with the seriousness of the matter).
144. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
145. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
146. See id. at 759 (explaining that the parents' commanding interest in raising their
children weighs against use of the preponderance of the evidence standard); Lassiter, 452
U.S. at 27 (explaining that under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976),
determination of what process is due requires the Court to balance the private interests,
the government interests, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation).
147. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31. Ultimately, the Court determined that the plaintiff's
case did not warrant appointed counsel because the evidence against her was strong and
because she failed to attend an earlier hearing about her parental rights. See id. at 32-33.
But see William L. Dick, Jr., Note, The Right to Appointed Counsel for Indigent Civil
Litigants: The Demands of Due Process, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627, 660-65 (1989)
(asserting that due process requires appointment of counsel in all parental rights
terminations).
148. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424)).
149. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (holding that facially neutral
statutes would not be invalidated merely for disproportionate impact).
150. Cf. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Under the rule announced
today, I do not see how a civil litigant could constitutionally be denied a free transcript in
any case that involves an interest that is arguably as important as the interest in
Mayer .... "). As noted in S.L.J.'s brief, no other federal appellate court has found such a
right to exist. See Brief for Respondents at 4, M.L.B. (No. 95-583).
151. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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rights involved." z  Later decisions established that the rights in
Boddie did not extend to cases in which the litigants had less than a
fundamental interest at stake." In accordance with the heightened
protection traditionally due fundamental fights, the Court also has
suggested that parents in certain complex termination hearings might
be entitled to counsel' and has held that states would have to prove
their cases with clear and convincing evidence."5 In M.L.B., the
Court extended these protections one step further by requiring that
states provide indigent parents a free transcript for their appeals.56
Although not expressly emphasized in the majority opinion, the
Court's holding appears to be prompted by two distinct factors: (1)
the state monopolization over parental termination proceedings, and(2) the deprivation of a fundamental right in parenthood. As for the
first factor, the majority cited several cases in which
"monopolization" was a concern." Generally, monopolization is a
concern when a statute's wealth classification threatens access to a
fundamental right and the indigent's only form of redress is through
the government.5 As M.L.B. has now confirmed, when a state
monopolizes the resolution of issues surrounding a fundamental
right, the Court will not bar access. 9 Abandonment of the monopoly
doctrine is unlikely, as one commentator has argued that abandoning
the doctrine would leave the Court with only two choices: (1)
requiring the states to provide all services necessary for the exercise
152. See id. at 383; see also supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text (discussing
Boddie).
153. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that
there is no fundamental interest in welfare payments); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434, 445 (1973) (holding that right to discharge debt in bankruptcy proceedings is not
fundamental); see also supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (discussing Ortwein and
Kras).
154. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,31 (1981).
155. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,769 (1982).
156. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570.
157. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 383 (holding that state monopolization over divorce
proceedings entitled appellants to proceed in forma pauperis); cf Kras, 409 U.S. at 445-46
(refusing to extend Boddie to bankruptcy cases since there are other means of resolving
such disputes).
158. See Lupu, supra note 81, at 1006. In parental rights cases, for example,
monopolization is an issue because parental rights may be terminated only by judicial
decree. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748-49 (explaining that if the state can prove that a
child has been permanently neglected, the family court judge is thereby empowered to
terminate the natural parent's rights in the child). The Court in Santosky noted that while
statutory mechanisms for restoring previously terminated parental rights did exist under
New York law, such mechanisms had never been successfully invoked. See id. at 749 n.1.
159. Cf. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376 (acknowledging that seeking marriage and divorce in
any state requires the invocation of the state government).
640 [Vol. 76
RIGHT OF ACCESS IN CIVIL COURTS
of fundamental rights, or (2) exploring the adequacy of the market to
provide the benefit for which the state charges a fee.'"
Also functioning in M.L.B. is the notion that, if the Mississippi
procedure were allowed to stand, the State would be working a
complete devastation and deprivation of one of M.L.B.'s
fundamental rights-her right to raise a family. As evidenced by
previous decisions, the Court abhors a deprivation of a fundamental
right."' In Plyler v. Doe, 2 for example, the Court held that a state
cannot deny free public education to aliens even if the aliens were
not legal residents of the state." The decision in Plyler stands in
stark contrast to San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,'" in which the Court upheld a statute distributing
education funding based on property taxes, despite claims that those
individuals in the wealthier tax districts were receiving a much better
education.'6 In Rodriguez, the Court reasoned that the class was too
large and amorphous to be suspect' and that the education provided
was adequate, notwithstanding significant variances in quality
between tax districts. 7 The difference, then, between the two cases
could be attributed to the outright denial of an education in Plyler,
instead of mere unequal benefits under the Texas law in Rodriguez.'"
160. See Lupu, supra note 81, at 1007-08; cf. Christopher E. Austin, Note, Due Process,
Court Access Fees, and the Right to Litigate, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 768, 773 (1982)
(suggesting that a procedural due process analysis under the factors in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), would be a preferable approach, occasionally allowing
access even without monopolization).
161. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (striking down a statute that
required payment of a large fee to run for office); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243
(1970) (striking down a statute that required indigent prisoners to remain in prison after
completing their sentences if they could not pay fines that had been components of those
sentences); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (requiring the State to provide
representation for indigents who could not afford counsel and had no other means to
appeal).
162. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
163. Seei. at230.
164. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
165. See id. at 55.
166. See id. at 28.
167. See id. at 25.
168. Compare Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (striking down a statute that
denied education to children of illegal aliens), and Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55 (upholding a
statute that funded schools based on property taxes and therefore created disparate
facilities), with Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (upholding a statute that did not
provide funds for abortions that were not medically necessary), and Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (striking down a statute that prohibited abortions altogether). In
Rodriguez and Maher, the state statutes withstood the Court's scrutiny because they did
not deprive or interfere with a fundamental right. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; Rodriguez,
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In M.L.B.'s case, the $2000 fee for a transcript threatened to stand in
the way of her fundamental right to raise a family, and the Court duly
invalidated the procedure. If the transcript had cost merely $200,
however, the Court might have reached a different conclusion,
because such a case arguably would not have created a deprivation.
This distinction begs the question: At what point does a fee for a
transcript in these cases work an outright deprivation? It is
unsettling questions like these that lead to the assertion that such
matters are more appropriately resolved by a legislature.169
Given the Court's demonstrated willingness to provide
protections for parents, the result in M.L.B. logically follows from its
earlier holdings."" Moreover, M.L.B.'s claim appears to be
reasonable and non-frivolous. 7' No matter how sensible the decision
seems, however, the Court did not give any specific source for the
right it bestowed.'2 Instead, the Court self-consciously refused to
give a precise rationale for its holding, reasoning that such cases
"'cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole
analysis.' ,,rn Although the majority claimed that due process and
equal protection principles converge,' 4 it is unclear whether anything
in the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to a free transcript
in a civil appeal. 5
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no one shall be
411 U.S. at 36-37.
169. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,772 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Then-Justice Rehnquist contended that "fixing the standard of proof as a matter of
federal constitutional law will only lead to further federal-court intervention in state
schemes." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
170. See, e.g., id. at 753 ("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the
care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents...."); Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27
(1981) (observing that parental rights to care for children warranted deference and
protection, absent a countervailing state interest); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981)
("This Court frequently has stressed the importance of familial bonds, ... and accorded
them constitutional protection."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(recognizing a fundamental interest in marriage and raising a family).
171. Cf. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 567 ("It would be anomalous to recognize a right to a
transcript needed to appeal a misdemeanor conviction-though trial counsel may be flatly
denied-but hold, at the same time, that a transcript need not be prepared for M.L.B.-
though were her defense sufficiently complex, State-paid counsel ... would be designated
for her.").
172. See id. at 571 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Cjarrying forward the ambiguity in the
cases on which it relies, the majority does not specify the source of the relief it grants."),
173. Id. at 566 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,666 (1983)).
174. See id.
175. See Ud at 571 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 76642
RIGHT OF ACCESS IN CIVIL COURTS
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 76 In
parental rights termination proceedings, parents face the potential
loss of both property and liberty interests." Thus, due process is
clearly required, and the question inevitably becomes how much due
process is required to satisfy the constitutional requirements.
If analyzed solely in terms of procedural due process, the Court's
due process reasoning is difficult to sustain."' As Justice Thomas
observed, M.L.B. received both notice and an opportunity to be
heard, as well as representation by counsel.' Under Mathews v.
Eldridge,"'O procedural due process requires "consideration of three
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used ...; and finally, the
Government's interest ... ...... The Court could have concluded that
although M.L.B.'s private interest was commanding, the State's
interest in recovering its court costs was substantial and the risk of
error was slight, given all the procedural protections M.L.B.
enjoyed." 2
If considered solely in terms of substantive due process, an
analysis of the majority opinion reveals similar problems. The Court
admitted that due process does not require any appeals," yet it
rested its due process analysis on the monopoly doctrine of Boddie v.
Connecticut.' As Justice Thomas quickly pointed out, however, the
problem with relying on Boddie is that the parties there were not
appealing, but were seeking their first hearing."' Again, because
M.L.B. had notice of the proceeding and was represented by counsel,
and because her unfitness as a parent had to be established with clear
176. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
177. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The loss of a liberty interest occurs when parents are deprived of their right
"to associate with [their] child"; the loss of property occurs because parents have a
statutory right of inheritance. See idL (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 571 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Procedural due process
analysis would require a balancing of the private interests, the countervailing
governmental interests, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
179. See ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
180. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
181. Id. at 335.
182. Cf. ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Due process has never
compelled an appeal where, as here, its rigors are satisfied by an adequate hearing.").
183. See id. at 560.
184. See ad at 562.
185. See id. at 572 (Thomas, I., dissenting).
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and convincing evidence, it is unclear how her due process rights
were violated.'" Also, the substantive due process argument can be
criticized on its usual pitfalls: that a precise source of fundamental
rights is uncertain and ill-defined and can lead to inconsistent
results.1"
The majority opinion also may be criticized on equal protection
grounds." Justice Thomas summarized the problem in his dissent:
I see no principled difference between a facially neutral rule
that serves in some cases to prevent persons from availing
themselves of state employment, or a state-funded
education, or a state-funded abortion-each of which the
State may, but is not required to, provide-and a facially
neutral rule that prevents a person from taking an appeal
that is available only because the State chooses to provide
it.189
Justice Thomas cited Washington v. Davis1" in his criticism of the
majority opinion.191 In Davis, the Court determined that any rule,
neutral on its face but disproportionately affecting certain groups of
people, would not be considered unconstitutional unless it could be
proven to have a discriminatory purpose."9 In M.L.B., the majority
agreed with Justice Thomas that the Mississippi statute was facially
neutral, but did not require M.L.B. to prove any discriminatory
intent, reasoning that the statute visited different consequences on
different sets of people. 93 Justice Thomas further observed that
equal protection had been served since M.L.B.'s indigence prevented
186. See iL (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) ("It is
not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-
12 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that substantive due process review requires
judges to determine constitutional validity "on the basis of their own appraisal of what
laws are unwise or unnecessary"); Austin, supra note 160, at 772 (arguing that the
substantive due process approach has led to "inconsistent, confusing, and often incorrect
decisions" in the lower courts).
188. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 572-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189. Ild. at 574 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
191. See ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 573-74 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
192. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-42. Professor Klarman has remarked that "subsequent
decisions have established that equal protection claimants, to succeed under Davis, must
demonstrate a legislature's deliberate efforts to harm blacks (or another protected
group), not simply an indifferent awareness that such harm was likely." Klarman, supra
note 115, at 298.
193. See ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 558; cf id. at 573 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
equal protection claimants must do more than show disproportionate impact).
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her only from appealing her hearing, a right that in the civil context
has never been considered fundamental under any form of equal
protection analysis.94
If viewed separately, the procedural due process, substantive due
process, and equal protection analyses employed by the majority
each have their respective weaknesses,' and Justice Thomas's
dissent readily exposes them.'96 The problem with Justice Thomas's
approach, however, is that the Court has not typically rested its
opinions on due process or equal protection alone when considering
indigents' access to courts, but instead has used the concepts in
tandem to reach its decisions.' Although at least one commentator
has objected to this commingling, 9 ' the M.L.B. Court confirmed that
it will continue to review cases under procedural due process,
substantive due process, and equal protection simultaneously.'
Moreover, Justice Thomas's dissent does not provide any
satisfactory alternatives to the majority's conclusions. He sought out
flaws in the majority's reasoning but did not offer solutions. Instead,
he recommended overruling Griffin v. Illinois and the line of cases
that followed.w One problem with overruling Griffin, however, is
that many indigent defendants in criminal cases would no longer have
any means of defending themselves. If indigent criminal defendants
are not provided with assistance, then it would be unreasonable to
provide assistance for indigents in any given legal context. To make
such a rule would certainly "bolt the door to equal justice.'
194. See id. at 574 (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349
(1976) (rejecting the argument that appellate review of an administrative procedure was
required when disability benefits were reduced).
195. See supra notes 178-94 and accompanying text.
196. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 571-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
197. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). In Bearden, the Court
remarked that in cases decided under the holding in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(plurality opinion), "[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge." Bearden,
461 U.S. at 665.
198. See Lupu, supra note 81, at 981. Professor Lupu claims that "the partnership of
liberty and equality in the fourteenth amendment... has led the Court into a tangle." Id.
at 983. Professor Lupu further argues that "[ljiberty against government and equality
under the law are not fungible concepts, and the majesty of both is sullied by attempts to
treat them as such." Id. at 1026.
199. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566. Justice Ginsburg explained that "[a] 'precise
rationale' has not been composed, because cases of this order 'cannot be resolved by
resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.'" Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608 (1974) ("precise rationale"); Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666
("pigeonhole analysis")).
200. See id. at 575 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
201. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Perhaps the most daunting problem facing the Court in a case
like M.L.B. is the peculiar role of parental termination adjudication
in the court system.2 While a private party may petition for
termination, more frequently the state will bring the suit.2° The state
accuses the parents of wrongdoing and the parties then become
adversaries, as in a criminal trial.w If the state wins, the parents lose
their rights and their relationship with their children o5 in much the
same way a criminal defendant loses his liberty. As several cases
have discerned, the gravity of loss for the parents is "'more
substantial than mere loss of money.' "" The implication of a
judgment for the state is that the parents are unfit to raise their
children--much like the implication in a criminal trial that a
defendant is unfit to live in free society.= The above factors all make
parental termination proceedings quite different from most other
types of civil litigation. Thus, although M.L.B.'s adversary was her
ex-husband, and not the state, it is easy to see why the Court views an
indigent parent in her situation "[1]ike a defendant resisting criminal
conviction.. ' .
The Court's emphasis on parenthood raises another question
regarding the limitations on its holding. Parenting involves many
different aspects of living. At a minimum, parents must provide
adequate food, housing, and clothing for their children.2 0 If the
parents' need to provide these items is inextricably linked with their
fundamental interests in parenthood, it seems likely that a court,
based on the holding in M.L.B., could stretch the Fourteenth
202. See ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 568 ("M.L.B.'s complaint is of a different order. She is
endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction of her family bonds, and to resist
the brand associated with a parental unfitness adjudication."); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
50 (1967) (holding that the privilege against self-incrimination applies in juvenile court
proceedings, even though such proceedings have been deemed civil).
203. See MARK HARDIN & ROBERT LANCOUR, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON
CHILDREN AND THE LAW, EARLY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: DEVELOPING
APPROPRIATE STATUTORY GROUNDS 5 (1996) ("Most terminations of parental rights
occur after parents have failed to respond to agency efforts to help.").
204. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,759-61 (1982).
205. See id. at 760.
206. Id. at 756 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,424 (1979)).
207. See id at 760.
208. Cf. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 42 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that termination proceedings closely resemble criminal
prosecutions). Justice Blaclmun commented that the proceeding "has an obvious
accusatory and punitive focus." Id. at 43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
209. ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 568.
210. See TOWER, supra note 4, at 20-25 (explaining the myriad functions of the
modem family).
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Amendment to protect any interest related to parenthood.211 It
would appear that the Court wanted to leave room for flexibility,
212
but the Court also flatly stated that its decision will not open the
floodgates to other related litigation. " Justice Thomas, however,
expressed concern that the majority was creating a broad precedent.
"Under the rule announced today," he wrote, "I do not see how a
civil litigant could constitutionally be denied a free transcript in any
case that involves an interest that is arguably as important as the
interest in Mayer .... ,,2I4 Indeed, the majority's confidence in the
restrictive nature of its holding15 seems presumptuous, given that
nowhere in the opinion did the Court specify how its holding should
be limited.
The holding of M.L.B. certainly expands indigent access to the
courts, at least when parental rights are at issue, but the principles
espoused in the case have long been recognized.2 '6 When the Court
once denied certiorari to a group of cases that Justice Black deemed
worthy of review, he thoroughly explained his opinions on the matter
of meaningful access to the courts:
[T]here cannot be meaningful access to the judicial process
until every serious litigant is represented by competent
counsel.... [T]he fundamental importance of legal
representation in our system of adversary justice is beyond
dispute. Since Boddie held that there must be meaningful
access to civil courts in divorce cases, I can only conclude
that Boddie necessitates the appointment of counsel for
indigents in such cases.'
211. See ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 576-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But cf United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 447 (1973) (disallowing an indigent the right to proceed in forma
pauperis in bankruptcy proceedings even though the appellant was unemployed and
supporting three children, one of whom was seriously ill).
212. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566-67.
213. See id. at 570.
214. Id. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 570. "Our Lassiter and Santosky decisions, recognizing that parental
termination decrees are among the most severe forms of state action, have not served as
precedent in other areas. We are therefore satisfied that the label 'civil' should not entice
us to leave undisturbed the Mississippi courts' disposition of this case." Id. (citations
omitted).
216. See Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 955-56 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that courts should be accessible to all
litigants); Pankratz, supra note 119, at 1109 (maintaining that a right of access to the
courts is meaningless without access to counsel); Austin, supra note 160, at 803 (arguing
that civil litigants should have a right of access when appealing an administrative decision
on constitutional grounds to reduce their welfare benefits).
217. Meltzer, 402 U.S. at 959 (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citations
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One commentator has argued that "[c]ounsel at affordable fees
should be available to indigents and to poor but nonindigent persons
with the assistance, when needed, of partial public subsidy."
219
Therefore, while certainly expansive when compared to its previous
decisions, the majority's approach in M.L.B. is far from
revolutionary.
Despite several weaknesses, the majority's decision achieves
justice. Although Mississippi's fee requirement is not arbitrary, there
is no good reason that it should impede parents from protecting their
rights in their children, either. The right to parent should not depend
in any way on how much money a person has. Justice Thomas's
assertion that this fee resembles payment of university tuition fees 9
is inapposite because there are other means to afford an education.
When the state steps in to remove a child, however, parents who wish
to keep their children have no choice but to defend their rights in
court.'m Certainly the parents should pay for their court costs when
they are able, but not allowing them to defend their rights-even in
an appeal-is an affront to equal justice. 1
The problem may lie less with the Court's reasoning than with
the very nature of parental termination adjudications.' Because the
state usually intervenes to remove the child, because the result is final
and irrevocable, and because presumably there is a vast difference in
the resources available to the state and to individual litigants,
affording parents the utmost protections under the Constitution is
only fair. Perhaps a better solution would be for states to change the
termination process to make the consequences less disheartening,2m
omitted).
218. Lois G. FORER, MONEY AND JUSTICE: WHO OwNS THE COURTS? 206 (1984).
219. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 573 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas analogized
the filing fee required by the statute in Mississippi to a university's tuition charges,
arguing that in both situations the state is merely recovering the costs of a service it
chooses to provide. See id. at 574 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
220. Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759-61 (1982) (explaining how the
termination proceeding pits the state directly against the parents).
221. Cf Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198 (1971) (determining that indigent
defendants threatened with fines instead of imprisonment were still entitled to a free
transcript). In Mayer, the Court remarked that Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(plurality opinion), stood for a "flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of
as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own way." Mayer,
404 U.S. at 196-97.
222. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967) (arguing that the civil "label-of-
convenience" should not be determinative in juvenile court proceedings).
223. See HARDIN & LANCOUR, supra note 203, at 3-4. The authors suggest several
alternatives to termination of parental rights: (1) guardianship by close relatives,
presumably allowing the biological parents to remain in contact with their children, and
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but the Court cannot effect such changes on its own. Also, states face
difficulties in changing the parental termination process because such
changes could do more harm than good-making termination
reversible, for example, could lead to a more unsettled life for
adopted children 2 4
That the Chancellor failed to give M.L.B. any explanation for his
decision seems to have troubled the Court greatly.' In a footnote,
the Court detailed that the Chancellor found serious abuse,22 6 but
S.L.J. did not allege abuse in his complaint or in the proceedings.'
For those who argue that the Court went too far in requiring a
transcript, perhaps the state should at least be required to provide
parents with an explanation of the evidence against them. Before
destroying such a close relationship, a court should be required to
give parents its reasons for doing so.
While it is easy to disapprove of parents who neglect and abuse
their children, it is also important to remember that false accusations
are possible.' Just as our society requires evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt to convict a criminal, so should it take extra care
before "convicting" a parent. While allowing M.L.B. and other
parents like her a free transcript is a financial burden on the state, in
the end everyone's interests are served when the right decision is
made. In coming to the right decision, there should be no difference
between those who can afford a transcript and those who cannot.
MARY MCCRORY KRUPNOW
(2) "open adoption," a possibility available in several states, whereby parents retain
limited rights to information, contacts, or visits with their children. See ia.
224. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 56-57 n.4
(1986). The authors explain that while the usual remedy for a due process violation in a
termination proceeding is to return the child to the parent, in one case the district court
and the appellate court were inclined to favor the foster parents in fear of uprooting the
child. See id; see also 2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE
AND ADOPTION CASES 13 (1993) (discussing bonding between foster parents and
children, especially when termination proceedings are lengthy).
225. SeeM.L.B., 117S. Ct. at 559-60.
226. See id. at 559 n.1.
227. See id.
228. See Shaun Assael, Child Abuse: Guilty Until Proven Innocent?, PARENTS MAG.,
July 1995, at 36, 36 (describing one mother's ordeal when a neighbor with a grudge
accused her of child abuse and a termination proceeding was brought against her and
eventually dismissed); Douglas J. Besharov & Lisa A. Laumann, Child Abuse Reporting,
SOCIETY, May-June 1996, at 40,42 (discussing the large number of unfounded child abuse
and neglect reports).
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